The BITE Model is a framework developed by mental health professional Steven Hassan for understanding the ways high-control groups exert undue influence over their members. It organizes these dynamics into four broad categories: Behavior, Information, Thought, and Emotion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
No single incident demonstrates that an organization is a high-control group. The relevant question is whether the same patterns recur across many different people and situations over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
During my 11 years in O.T.O. \u2014 first as an enthusiastic member, and later as Master of Horizon Lodge \u2014 I repeatedly encountered organizational dynamics that the BITE model helped me recognize and organize. What follows is not a comprehensive account of every troubling experience I had, but a selection of representative examples.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This essay is not an attempt to prove that O.T.O. is a cult in some absolute sense. Rather, it asks a narrower question: to what extent do the recurring organizational dynamics I observed over 11 years resemble the forms of influence described by Hassan’s BITE model? The goal is not to persuade readers through any single anecdote, but rather to identify recurring mechanisms that only became visible over time. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
At first glance, O.T.O. doesn’t resemble the stereotypical image of a cult. Members live independently, hold ordinary jobs, and are free to leave. The organization is often disorganized, financially modest, and decentralized. Members are not required to believe particular theological claims; nor does the organization exercise the kind of total behavioral control associated with groups like Scientology or Jehovah’s Witnesses. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet high-control groups exist on a spectrum. Organizations can exert powerful forms of informational, social, and emotional control without dictating every aspect of members’ lives. That is why I found Steven Hassan’s BITE model helpful. The question isn\u2019t whether an organization is completely controlling. It\u2019s how<\/em> and to what extent<\/em> it influences its members. <\/p>\n\n\n\n O.T.O. does not strongly exhibit every dimension of the BITE model. In my experience, behavioral control was comparatively weak, while information control and social pressure surrounding criticism were much more prominent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n If someone had suggested to me in 2024 that O.T.O. was a high-control group, I probably would have dismissed the idea. My own image of high-control groups involved organizations that tightly regulated members’ beliefs, finances, relationships, and daily lives. O.T.O. didn’t look like that. It was only after years of observing recurring patterns \u2014 and later encountering Hassan’s model \u2014 that I began to reconsider that assumption. <\/p>\n\n\n\n See The Experiment That Changed My Mind About Ordo Templi Orientis (O.T.O.)<\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “They’re keeping track of everyone’s stance on you.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Information control refers to efforts to shape what members know, whom they trust, and how information flows within an organization. It includes not only secrecy, but also surveillance, rumor, selective disclosure, and discouraging open discussion. <\/p>\n\n\n\n As an initiatory organization, O.T.O. naturally keeps some ritual material confidential until members reach particular degrees. That kind of secrecy is not harmful on its own. What concerned me were repeated patterns of information control that extended far beyond preserving spiritual teachings. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Shortly after my resignation, a member described a meeting they had with Sabazius, the National Grand Master in the United States. During the meeting, Sabazius displayed folders containing screenshots and other documents he had collected about ongoing situations within the Order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The folders included screenshots of my public posts about my resignation. They also contained screenshots of other people\u2019s friend-restricted posts about my resignation, along with those who commented either approvingly or disapprovingly on them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the attendee, I was not the only subject of this kind of documentation. The folders were organized around incidents rather than individuals, with screenshots and comments catalogued in a way that tracked where different members appeared to stand. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The attendee who shared this information with me concluded, “They’re keeping track of everyone’s stance on you.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n This wasn’t simply passive observation. It depended on members routinely forwarding information to leadership. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In spring 2025, I held a private, non-O.T.O. ritual for a small group of friends. I organized the event through a private Facebook page whose guest list was visible only to me. The event generated reports both before and after it occurred. <\/p>\n\n\n\n About an hour and a half before the event was supposed to start, I was contacted by a Sovereign Grand Inspector General (7th degree), whom I’ll call Heather. Heather said it was brought to her attention that I had invited someone to my event who was a suspended member and public critic of the Order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Since the guest list was private, the information appears to have come from someone who had access to the event page. <\/p>\n\n\n\n While I was not asked to uninvite him, I was told that if he said anything critical of the Order while at the event, it was expected I would ask him to leave. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Later, during the national call in which Sabazius shared his social media screenshot archive, he shared not only screenshots of the private event page I had created for this event, but a memo on it written by one of the event\u2019s attendees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This attendee \u2014 an O.T.O. 6th degree I had considered a good friend \u2014 described the event\u2019s ritual symbolism in detail and included a list of the event\u2019s O.T.O. and non-O.T.O. attendees. The memo was used by Sabazius as evidence I was mentally unstable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The issue was not simply that people shared information. It was that ordinary acts of friendship \u2014 inviting someone to a private gathering, speaking candidly in front of trusted companions \u2014 could unexpectedly become part of the organization’s internal reporting network. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These incidents did not stand alone. Over the years, I repeatedly encountered situations in which members’ speech \u2014 particularly criticism of leadership \u2014 was monitored, screenshotted, and discussed outside its original context: <\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor was this practice denied. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the summer of 2025, a former member of the Electoral College responded to one of my videos about O.T.O.’s surveillance culture by defending the practice, describing it as “bringing receipts.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n What these incidents illustrate is an informal expectation that information about other members \u2014 particularly information that might concern leadership \u2014 should be passed upward through the hierarchy. The practical effect is the blurring of lines between friendship and institutional control, O.T.O. membership and private life. Private conversations, private events, and trusted personal bonds can become sources of intelligence for the organization\u2019s leadership. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In my experience, informal rumors often traveled more quickly \u2014 and sometimes carried more weight \u2014 than official communications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In September 2022, I filed a confidential complaint with the Secretary of the Electoral College of United States Grand Lodge. The Secretary was obligated to keep the information confidential. Instead, he shared it with his wife, another O.T.O. member. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In doing so, he mistakenly told her that I had accused another member of screenshots and misinformation that I had never attributed to her. The wife then shared this false rumor with two other members \u2014 who in turn shared it with more people. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The rumor spread so widely that I eventually heard it from a friend who was not even an O.T.O. member. I was stunned \u2014 not only because the information was false, but because it implicated another member whom I was certain had done nothing of the sort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When I eventually pieced together what happened, I was appalled \u2014 not only by the way information had been distorted and spread so widely, but by the lack of accountability of the participants.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead of taking responsibility, one person involved \u2014 Heather \u2014 said, \u201cI don\u2019t think [their] reputation will be damaged by this. But you are a good friend to be concerned.\u201d She was later promoted to Sovereign Grand Inspector General, a position that routinely involves receiving and evaluating highly sensitive reports, including victim statements. <\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the 6th degrees involved initially accepted responsibility for his role in spreading the rumor. The following day, however, he reversed course, telling me that sharing and discussing this kind of information was part of his duty as a member of Kaaba, the section of United States Grand Lodge responsible for leadership training. He too was later promoted to Sovereign Grand Inspector General. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Secretary later apologized and told me he had reported the incident to the President of the Electoral College. <\/p>\n\n\n\n What struck me was not only that a false rumor spread. It was that confidential information entrusted to an officer of the Order became the basis for speculation, and that once the mistake was uncovered, few involved appeared to regard correcting it \u2014 or accepting responsibility for it \u2014 as especially important. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In my experience, unofficial information often traveled farther and faster than official communication. Rumor frequently filled the vacuum created by opaque decision-making processes, making it difficult for members to distinguish verified information from speculation \u2014 or to know whom they could safely trust with sensitive information. <\/p>\n\n\n\n O.T.O.’s disciplinary and advancement processes often operate through substantial informational asymmetry, with complaints often disappearing into a black box.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A member filed a complaint against a local body master alleging multiple forms of serious misconduct. Rather than hearing back from the governing body to which they had submitted the complaint, they eventually heard from another individual not directly involved that the complaint would not be acted upon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In another disciplinary case involving allegations of sexual misconduct, the process unfolded over nearly eight years. Participants struggled to determine what information decision-makers actually possessed, why particular decisions had been reached, or even which governing bodies were responsible at different stages. A witness statement containing a firsthand allegation of sexual assault was never forwarded to the disciplinary body responsible for deciding the case. Years later, an independent investigator uncovered additional evidence that had likewise never been considered during the original proceedings. <\/p>\n\n\n\n When decision-making is this opaque, accountability becomes difficult. Members cannot meaningfully evaluate whether procedures were followed, whether evidence was considered, or whether outcomes reflect the facts of the case or other institutional pressures. (See: When the System Failed: What the Case of Adam Revealed About O.T.O.<\/a><\/em>) <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cYou may appear to assert you have expertise beyond the authority of members in good standing of higher degrees.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n Thought control does not necessarily require brainwashing or members to unquestioningly adopt an ideology. It can also operate by shaping how they interpret disagreement, criticism, authority, and one another. Certain explanations become socially acceptable, while others become difficult to entertain. <\/p>\n\n\n\n After I resigned and publicly criticized O.T.O., the organization’s senior leadership did not primarily address my criticisms. Instead, they focused on explaining why I had made them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n During a meeting with other members, Sabazius described me as suffering from “spiritual psychosis” and said my “ego couldn’t handle being in O.T.O.” <\/p>\n\n\n\n As evidence of this diagnosis, he cited claims that: <\/p>\n\n\n\n This was not unique to my resignation. Over the years I repeatedly watched members reframe criticism of the organization as evidence of personal defects rather than occasions to examine the criticism itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Someone would write a book or article critical of O.T.O. policy, and rather than engage with the substance of the argument, discussion would often shift toward the author’s personality, friendships, motives, or personal history. And this was done even when the person was a member in good standing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Once someone left the organization, the rhetoric often became considerably harsher. One local body master spoke of \u201cdespising\u201d a former member critical of O.T.O.\u2019s initiatory practices. On another occasion, this same individual described his desire to physically assault a critic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over time I came to recognize this as a recurring pattern at every level of the organization. Rather than treating criticism as something to be evaluated on its merits, members often interpreted it as evidence that the critic was immature, obsessive, narcissistic, mentally ill, spiritually unstable, morally repugnant, or undergoing a midlife crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The practical effect of this pattern was that the cost of criticism was character assassination. To question the organization meant risking not only disagreement but having one’s motives, judgment, or mental health called into question.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another pattern I observed was that public disagreement was often treated not just as difference of opinion, but as evidence of disloyalty \u2014 to senior members, to the organization, and to its spiritual principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2022, I wrote an article in which I disagreed with an interpretation of the Gnostic Mass \u2014 O.T.O.\u2019s central ritual \u2014 which had been put forward for over a decade by Lon and Constance Duquette, two popular 9th degrees. The article was respectful. I criticized their interpretation, not their character. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Later that year, my 5th degree sponsor reached out to me at the urging of the head of our local Rose-Croix Chapter, to discuss concerns about the article and social media posts I had written the previous summer while brainstorming it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n I reached out to him personally to get a better sense of his concerns. He said I \u201cmay appear to assert [I] have expertise beyond the authority of members in good standing of higher degrees.\u201d I was also told I \u201cmay wish to review the III\u00b0 oath in that regard.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a line in the 3rd degree oath in which the candidate swears to look with respect and reverence on members of higher grades. The implication was that disagreeing publicly with two 9th degrees was itself a failure of reverence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was relayed to me later that the High Priestess of the Chapter was making similar claims to others, implying I had violated my sacred oath by publicly disagreeing with influential members.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2021, Agap\u00e9<\/em> \u2014 the official publication of United States Grand Lodge \u2014 published an article I wrote in which I disagreed with Dionysius Rogers, a high-ranking member of O.T.O., on questions of theology. In particular, I took exception to his claim that questions of theology were exclusively the concern of 9th degree members of O.T.O.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Later I heard from multiple people that Dionysius was upset that I had \u201cgone after\u201d him and the DuQuettes. He referred to me as a \u201cshit-stirrer\u201d and unfavorably compared me with IAO131, an outspoken critic who had been suspended. Here again, disagreement itself was interpreted as aggression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A similar pattern emerged during my vetting for 5th degree. Social media posts expressing unorthodox views on theology and organizational policy were reportedly discussed as “concerns” about my suitability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n I can\u2019t think of a single time an issue was made of the substance of my arguments. Instead, the act of publicly disagreeing with influential members was itself treated as evidence that I lacked the proper attitude toward authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over time I simply stopped publicly disagreeing with influential members. My views hadn\u2019t changed, but I came to expect that disagreement itself would be interpreted as disrespect, disloyalty, or evidence of poor judgment. The result was not formal censorship but self-censorship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another recurring pattern was that members often responded to situations using the same small set of scripted responses. Rather than evaluating each situation independently, they seemed to reach for familiar explanations that preserved existing assumptions about the organization and its leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2019, Sabazius pressured a 6th degree member to remove former member and critic IAO131 as administrator of a privately owned Facebook group unrelated to O.T.O. The member believed refusing would lead to discipline. He complied under protest and later resigned from the Order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When I raised concerns with fellow members about this, instead of taking the concern seriously, I was asked whether Sabazius \u201creally ordered\u201d this 6th degree to break ties \u2014 or whether he was merely expressing his personal preference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n I heard this response from no fewer than 5 members \u2014 leaving me wondering whether there was coordination, or everyone just happened to fall back on the same language.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether Sabazius had literally issued an order was not the central issue. The concern was that a senior leader had exerted pressure on a subordinate to end a personal relationship. Yet discussion repeatedly shifted toward the technical question of whether the pressure qualified as an “order,” as though resolving that semantic point also resolved the ethical concern.<\/p>\n\n\n\nInformation Control<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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A Culture of Surveillance and Informing<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Rumor as Organizational Currency<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Opaque Decision-Making <\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Thought Control<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Pathologizing Dissent<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Disagreement as Disloyalty<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Scripted Interpretations <\/h3>\n\n\n\n