Logical Framework

Part 2 of the Dualism, Monism & Thelema Series

For there to exist a dualism between two terms, there must be a distinction to be made between them. Likewise, to speak of the same two things from a monistic perspective means in some sense to deny the distinction between them.

The philosophical tradition has acknowledged at least three kinds of distinctions since the time of Descartes in the 17th century: real distinctions, modal distinctions, and rational distinctions.

In order to understand the three kinds of distinctions, it’s necessary to understand the terminology Descartes used to talk about substances and properties.

Substances and their Properties

Substances

A substance is anything that does not depend on anything else for its existence.

Strictly speaking, from Descartes’s perspective, God is the only substance, since all things come from God and depend upon His continual support. More loosely speaking, though, anything that depends only on God for its existence could be thought of as a substance.

Under this looser criteria, Descartes recognizes the existence of three substances: God, body, and mind.

Principle Attributes of Substances

Substances can have many properties, but any property which makes the substance the kind of substance it is is called a principle attribute.

We have no idea what the principle attribute of God is, but the principle attribute of body is extension, and the principle attribute of mind is thought.

Principle attribute is just another way of saying essence.

Modes of Substances

A mode is a way of being of a principle attribute of a substance.

For example, shape is a principle attribute of a bodily substance, but being square is a mode.

Thought is a principle attribute of a mental substance, but being preoccupied is a mode.

Having established substances, principle attributes, and modes, let’s see what sorts of distinctions hold between them.

Distinctions between Substances, Principle Attributes, and Modes

Descartes tended to talk about distinctions in terms of the conditions of the existence of substances. I’m going to follow Leibniz instead and talk about the intelligibility of substances.

The Leibnizian school preferred talking about substances in terms of their respective intelligibilities rather than their existences, because otherwise it led to the conclusions of Spinozism, according to which there are no finite, dependent substances.

As it turns out, Crowley is much more of a Leibnizian than a Cartesian or Spinozist. As we’ll see, in order to conceive of multiple Stars, each being “God of Very God,” we will need the concept of a finite, dependent substance.

Real Distinctions

Two things are really distinct if and only if each is intelligible independently of the other. They must be either distinct substances or modes of distinct substances.

For example, I can conceive of (i.e., understand) the properties of a triangle without understanding anything about joy. I don’t ever have to have experienced joy or even heard of it in order to be able to deduce that the interior angles of a triangle add up to 180°. On the other hand, I don’t have to know the first thing about the geometry of triangles in order to know joy.

This is because triangularity and emotion are modes of independent substances (bodily substances and mental substances, respectively).

If we’re not being too strict, we could also say I don’t need to understand how to play chess in order to know how to drive (and vice versa). They are really distinct disciplines.

One of the implications of two things being really distinct is that negating one has no impact on the other.

Another implication is that, if x and y are really distinct, and if the ground of x is x’ and the ground of y is y’, then negating x’ has no impact on y, and negating y’ has no impact on x.

For example, the knowledge of trigometry (x) is based in the knowledge of geometry (x’). The knowledge of joy (y) is based in the knowledge of happiness (y’). Having never known happiness has no necessary impact on my understanding of trigometry, and having never known geometry has no necessary impact on my knowledge of joy.

Modal Distinctions

Two things are modally distinct if and only if (a) one is intelligible independently of the other but not vice versa, or, (b) either can exist without the other, but they have a necessary condition of their intelligibility in common.

Modal distinctions hold between (a) the essential property of a substance and a mode of the same substance, or, (b) between modes of the same substance.

An example of a modal distinction of the (a)-type is the distinction between being square (y) and having a shape (x). Shape is the essential property of a bodily substance. Being square is a mode or modification of shape. I can conceive of shape without knowing anything about squares in particular, but the reverse does not hold.

This is called a relationship of ground (x) and consequent (y). The negation of x necessarily entails the negation of y, but not vice versa.

The (b)-type modal distinction is between modes of the same substance.

For example, I was surprised when I got to college and realized I could do calculus without having to do algebra. (The teacher didn’t care if we reduced our answers.)

It’s not that algebra and calculus are really distinct, though. They’re modally distinct. Both are modifications of our understanding of number.

Another example of the (b)-type modal distinction is any distinction made between two very different emotions, e.g., love and hate. If I had never experienced the emotion of hate, it would have no impact on my ability to understand love and vice versa.

On the other hand, if I had no understanding at all what an emotion was, I would not be able to understand either.

If we want to speak more loosely, another example is that I don’t need to understand how to play jazz guitar in order to drum (or vice versa), but I need to understand how to keep time to do either.

One of the implications of the (b)-type modal distinction is that if x and y are modally distinct in this sense, then neither is the ground nor consequent of the other. Rather, they are both consequents of the same ground, z. The negation of x will not necessarily entail the negation of y (or vice versa), but the negation of z entails the negation of both x and y.

Another implication of the (b)-type modal distinction is that two things can appear to be really distinct when they are in fact modally distinct in the (b)-type sense.

Rational Distinctions

Two things are rationally distinct if and only if the distinction is being made between the object and itself, considered under two concepts.

In other words, we’re attempting to make a distinction between the substance and its principle attribute.

An example of a rational distinction would be between any bodily substance and its extension, since without extension, a bodily substance is inconceivable.

Modern philosophers talk about the difference between connotation and denotation. The same object (x) can be denoted (basically, referred to) under two connotations (basically, meanings).

The classical example of this is the distinction between Morning Star and Evening Star. These are two different connotations for the same object, the planet Venus.

The kinds of rational distinctions we’re going to look at will look very much like distinctions between different connotations of the same thing.

One of the implications of two things being rationally distinct is that the affirmation or negation of one will necessarily entail the affirmation or negation of the other. This is because they are both referring to (denote) the same thing.

Now that we have some tools, let’s use them to look at exactly what sorts of distinctions hold between:

  1. Nuit and Hadit.
  2. Nuit and Hadit and the Star.
  3. The Star and its Khu.
  4. One Star and any other Star.

Nihilism and spirituality

A friend of mine was recently telling me that he did not think beliefs were important to his spirituality. I think he meant that he was doing his best to take his experiences on their own terms without jumping to conclusions about how the world works.

Damien Echols recently said something similar on his youtube channel: that magick isn’t about beliefs. This is a common sentiment, and I’ve said similar things along the way.

I replied that I attributed most of my “success” (if you can call it that) in spirituality to my nihilism. Then I had to spend a little time figuring out what I even meant by that.

There’s a man who lived a very long time ago—about 2,500 years ago in fact—in Italy. He was a priest of Apollo and a prophet-healer—what in Greek was called an iatromantis—and his name was Parmenides. While he was in a state of trance, he went on what we might call an “astral journey” to the underworld. There he encountered a goddess who taught him about the world. When he came back from his journey, he wrote it all down in a poem which we now have only in fragments.

One of the first things the goddess tells him is that there are only two paths you can follow in life: the path of being and the path of non-being. What she meant is that something either is, or it isn’t. This seems like the simplest thing in the world, but she points out that most people live their lives acting as though things simultaneously are and aren’t.

Take for example secular humanism.

Secular humanism embraces reason, ethics, and naturalism without belief in religious dogma, supernaturalism, and the like. Mere humans are incapable of the God’s eye view on reality, and this belief gives rise to skepticism and tolerance of differing points of view.

This is all fine and good, but there’s only one problem. And that’s that secular humanism is itself a religious, even supernatural point of view.

There was a German philosopher in the 19th century named Hegel who pointed this out. He said quite rightly that it was absurd to judge the capacity of human cognition in relation to something which you yourself say doesn’t exist—in other words a mere figment of imagination.

Peter Kingsley makes a similar point in the context of Jungian depth psychology. Jungians insist that Jung restricted himself to the perspective of a mere observer of the archetypes. In other words he insisted on his own humble humanity in relation to divinity. Jung was certainly no “prophet,” let alone a magician!

The only problem with this, Kingsley points out, is that “humanity” is itself an archetype. And it’s a rather insidious archetype, as it tends to cover its own tracks. Nothing seems more humble than to restrict oneself to the perspective of a mere human. We wouldn’t want to engage in “ego inflation”. And yet this apparent self-restriction is the greatest inflation of all, since it is turned into the first and last word on any possible experience.

In a long series of talks on what he calls the meaning crisis, cognitive scientist John Vervaeke has pointed out that most of the structures by means of which we define our humanity themselves have a religious substrate or simply are religious in nature.

Basic notions like progress require a particular relationship to time and narrative that have their origins in the Old Testament. I would add that this isn’t just progress in the collective sense of humanity. Any notion of personal self-discovery or personal growth you have—the sort of learning-story that might make for an interesting autobiography—also depend upon the same structures.

In other words, the ways in which we understand our humanity, individually and collectively, is itself religious in nature. Insofar as secular humanism leans on a set of religious substructures to define knowledge and ethics abstracted from religious substructures, it is a self-contradiction.

For that matter, consensus Thelema falls into a similar if not the same trap. I’ve lost count of how many times I’ve heard Thelemites try to argue to me that human beings ought to treat one another according to such and such ethical principles—usually the ones enumerated in Liber Oz—because we are morally obligated to recognize one another as “stars”.

But there is no moral obligation beyond doing your will. Full stop. The imposition of any moral obligation beyond that just is religion in the Old Aeonic sense. And in fact the particular grounds on which this is justified—the obligation to recognize the divinity of another—is no different in spirit or in letter from Christian morality specifically!

That’s one helluva mistake to make!

If your interpretation of Liber Oz leads you to contradict the ethical core of Thelema—Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law—then you need to stop and figure out where your interpretation of Oz went wrong.

But again, this is just another, even more obvious example of attempting to have your cake and eat it too—or what the goddess in Parmenides’s poem refers to as the “wandering in two minds,” the behavior typical of “undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same thing and not the same is and is not, all things travel in opposite directions.”

But the situation is even worse than that. The goddess goes on to tell Parmenides that the choice between the path of being and the path of non-being is no choice at all, because there is only one path: the path of being.

I remember being a student and reading this and thinking, “My goodness! We have come so much further than this! Thank heavens we’ve learned to be more nuanced in our thinking since poor old Parmenides! We know now from so much more sophisticated thinkers that you can never step in the same river twice! We’ve learned from no less a genius than Aristotle to have moderation in all things! A little of this, a little of that, I say! All the world’s most sophisticated spiritual and religious teachers taught what, conveniently for me, accords with my own common sense! Something something modern studies show!”

But at some point I learned what all this really was. Not only is it delusional to think you can stake out a claim between these two opposed points of view of being and non-being.

It’s delusional to think there are opposed points of view in the first place.

This is bound to confuse and even upset people on more than one level.

To start, I did not follow a “heart-centered path” to my realization. I didn’t fall back upon my emotions or what I “intuited” that “the universe” wanted for me.

No, I simply followed logic.

My realization didn’t come while I was sitting in meditation (although I did spend a lot of time meditating up until that point). It came while I was thinking.

But I was not thinking the way people normally think. I was thinking in a completely uncompromising way. And as a result, for the first time in my life, I realized I couldn’t have it both ways. First I was forced into a choice, and then having made the choice, I realized there was never any choice in the first place.

And then the second bit that irritates people is that I did this shamelessly. I didn’t do what people normally do, which is to fuss endlessly with a teaching—making reason my master—and then pretending as though everything is a matter of “intuition” or feeling.

What I realized is that I was not going to “change my beliefs”. This was logically impossible. Beliefs aren’t changed into other beliefs, nor are they transformed into nothing. If you want to get rid of a belief, you need to drive it out with another belief.

And then it dawned on me that beliefs weren’t special. What I was realizing about beliefs applied to everything whatsoever, because change itself is an illusion.

Again, I could believe in everything, or I could believe in nothing. It didn’t matter which I chose, just that I was consistent. And then as soon as I was consistent, I realized I didn’t have a choice in the first place.

That was it. That was the moment I crossed the Abyss. I crossed from this world into the other world. I was freed from the limitations of the “merely human”. I became an immortal god.

And then I turned around to look back the way I came, and I realized the world I just crossed into was the world I had come from.

I had been there the entire time.