The Book of the Law is the key to understanding the theology of the Gnostic Mass and its Creed.
What is Thelema?
Thelema is a religion founded in 1904 by the English poet and mystic, Aleister Crowley (1875-1947), who is regarded as its prophet. Those who follow the path of Thelema are called Thelemites.1
Thelema (Θελημα) is a Greek word for will, and the essential teaching of Thelema is “Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.” Of this teaching Crowley said,
“Do what thou wilt…” is to bid Stars to shine, Vines to bear grapes, Water to seek its level; man is the only being in Nature that has striven to set himself at odds with himself.2
From this we may infer that the essential teaching of Thelema is that each person ought to live in accordance with nature as expressed through their individual being. In this respect, Thelema is similar to Stoicism, Buddhism, or other religions which teach us to live according to the laws set by nature rather than God or human beings. Yet the Thelemic view of the universe according to Crowley differs in fundamental respects from what is taught in other religions and philosophies.
“Had! The manifestation of Nuit. The unveiling of the company of heaven.” (AL I.1-2)3
The foundation of Thelema is Liber AL vel Legis, which is Latin for Book AL or the Book of the Law.4
The Book of the Law was dictated to Aleister Crowley in Cairo, Egypt in 1904 by a spiritual being that called itself Aiwass. This book declared a new age for humanity, the Aeon of the Child, and proclaimed a new law for the conduct of all human beings: Do what thou wilt.
The universe described by the Book of the Law consists in two irreducible entities or concepts: the totality of possibilities of all kind, and any point of view on those possibilities. The first is symbolized by the Egyptian sky goddess, Nuit, and the second is represented by the Egyptian sun god, Hadit.5
“Every man and every woman is a star.” (AL I.3)
Experience arises when Hadit (the self of each individual) unites with some possibility inherent in Nuit (the spatiotemporal universe). Each person is “an aggregate of such experiences, constantly changing with each fresh event” or a star.6
Crowley describes each individual star or consciousness as an absolute monad: simple, utterly indestructible, as well as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. These are characteristics usually attributed to God, and indeed, Crowley taught that each star was the center and origin of its own universe.7
“For I am divided for love’s sake, for the chance of union.” (AL I.29)
Throughout our lives, and even throughout the course of a day, many events occur that imply oppositions or dualities. We experience pleasant versus unpleasant sensations, sorrowful versus happy occurrences, success versus failure in our endeavors, cruelty versus kindness in our actions, self versus world, self versus others, and many more. But the universe appears to us this way, because it is only by means of opposition that our Hadit or god-self can have experience and learn about itself. While each of us encounters constant opposition from the world and others, this opposition is both necessary and willed.8 From this, the supreme teaching of Thelema follows:9
“Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law.” (AL I.40)
Crowley speaks of the will in two basic senses. On the one hand, each person has to discover for themselves what their purpose in life is. This could involve discovering which particular career or form of service suits your personality best and dedicating yourself wholeheartedly to it.10 It also means being free to express one’s individuality artistically and sexually, to work and to play as suits one’s own nature, and even to move across the face of the earth without interference from others.11 Crowley calls this the finite will or your will in the context of this life.12
Then there is your will in eternity or your infinite will, which is the will of Hadit—your true self—to explore every possibility available to itself, even across many incarnations. Crowley calls this the Great Work or the union of Hadit with Nuit.13
These need not be seen as two separate wills but rather two perspectives on the same will: the will seen from the perspective of this incarnation, where each moment presents us with the choice between doing our will versus not doing it, and the perspective of eternity, wherein every occurrence accords with our will, because every moment is necessary and perfect in and of itself.14
“Love is the law, love under will.” (AL I.57)
Every event whatsoever is an act of love, as each consists in the uniting of Hadit or the divine self of each individual with a possibility inherent in Nuit.15 While it is technically impossible not to do your will (seen from the infinite perspective), it is possible (from the finite perspective) to desire not to do your will, and from this arises suffering.16 It is therefore up to each of us to discover for ourselves what our true will is and to accept and desire to fulfill it rather than thwart it. Crowley calls the methods for achieving this magick.17
“Remember all ye that existence is pure joy; that all the sorrows are but as shadows; they pass & are done; but there is that which remains.” (AL II.9)
Since all events are acts of love under will, it follows that, at its very foundation, existence is joyful. Sorrow arises when we think of any two things as opposed to one another. Some one event pleases us so we call it “good,” and another is unpleasant so we call it “bad”. But they are all fundamentally “good,” because they are all the effect of Hadit loving Nuit, which itself is the natural result of each of us doing our will.18 This love of Hadit for Nuit eventually culminates in the union between the two which occurs at death, and therefore “death is the crown of all.”19
While there is more to Thelema than what is presented here, the rest are largely implications or practices intended to achieve these ideals. For further information, the reader is encouraged to explore the resources footnoted in this section.
1 https://oto-usa.org/thelema/
2 “Notes for an Astral Atlas,” in Magick in Theory and Practice (MITAP), Appendix III.
3 Chapters and verses of the Book of the Law are notated AL Chapter.Verse
4 AL is a Hebrew name for God.
5 Introduction to The Book of the Law (Intro).
6 Intro.
7 Intro and New Comment (NC) on AL I.3.
8 NC to AL I.29.
9 NC on AL I.3
10 MITAP (Introduction) and Liber CL (Section I).
11 Liber LXXVII.
12 Liber CL (Section I).
13 Ibid.
14 Intro.
15 Ibid.
16 NC on AL 1.51 and Liber CL.
17 Intro.
18 Djeridensis Comment on AL II.9.
19 NC on AL II.72.
References
- Crowley, Aleister. The Djeridensis Comment
- Crowley, Aleister. Liber CL
- Crowley, Aleister. Magick in Theory and Practice
- Crowley, Aleister. The New and Old Commentaries to Liber AL vel Legis, The Book of the Law
- Liber AL vel Legis sub figura CCXX with Introduction by Aleister Crowley
- United States Grand Lodge Ordo Templi Orientis
The argument against compassion
Please Note: It is up to each individual to decide this question (and all questions regarding Liber AL vel Legis) for themselves by appeal to Crowley’s writings (or however they see fit).
I’ve been thinking a lot lately about Crowley’s condemnation of compassion. This condemnation is in the Book of the Law itself (AL II.18-21), and Crowley himself elaborates on it in many places. Here are just two examples:
Compassion, the noblest virtue of the Buddhist, is damned outright by Aiwass. To “suffer with” some other being is clearly to cease to be oneself, to wander from one’s Way. It always implies error, no Point-of-View being the same as any other: and in Kings—leaders and rulers of men—such error is a vice. For it leads straight to the most foolish Rule ever laid down, “Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you.” (Djenerensis Comment to AL II.21)
And:
Of what use is it to perpetuate the misery of Tuberculosis, and such diseases, as we now do? Nature’s way is to weed out the weak … We must therefore go back to Spartan ideas of education; and the worst enemies of humanity are those who wish, under the pretext of compassion, to continue its ills through the generations … Let weak and wry productions go back into the melting-pot, as is done with flawed steel castings. Death will purge, reincarnation make whole, these errors and abortions. Nature herself may be trusted to do this, if only we will leave her alone. (New Comment on AL II.21)
But the condemnation of compassion does not necessarily entail indifference toward the distress of others:
Pity, sympathy and like emotions are fundamentally insults to the Godhead of the person exciting them, and therefore also to your own. The distress of another may be relieved; but always with the positive and noble idea of making manifest the perfection of the Universe. Pity is the source of every mean, ignoble, cowardly vice; and the essential blasphemy against Truth. (“Duty”)
In other words, acts of kindness are permissible if they are carried out for reasons other than pity. It’s not the effect that is condemned but the passion that could motivate it.
Of course one can cavil endlessly over what words mean, but these statements do not strike me as any more ambiguous than statements Crowley makes on subjects such as individual liberty and sexual freedom that many Thelemites take for granted.
The condemnation of compassion is not a standalone claim, something merely tacked on as an afterthought to Thelema. Crowley presented an argument against compassion that proceeds from premises accepted by many Thelemites, viz., love under will and the joyous nature of existence:
(1) “All Events are Acts of Love Under Will.” (DC on AL II.9)
(2) “[Therefore] Hadit now sayeth to all that they should be mindful of the Nature of that which exists; it is pure joy” (Ibid)
(3) “The highest are those who have mastered and transcended accidental environment. They rejoice, because they do their Will; and if any man sorrow, it is clear evidence of something wrong with him.” (NC on AL II.19)
(4) “[Those who suffer] had better “die in their misery”; that is, cease once and for all to react so feebly and wrongly as they do: for such a Point-of-View as they shew forth is not to be endured. It is not truly Hadit at all; not any one Point, but a shifting fulcrum: let it be no more counted among True Things.” (DC on AL II.21)
The argument is a little obscure between (2) and (3). A generous reconstruction might be:
- Any change from one thing into another is willed on the part of Hadit. But this is the same thing as Hadit once again loving Nuit, thereby dissolving the previous moment into ecstacy.
- So despite appearances, each moment is joyful or blissful. Dukkha is not the preeminent reality; ananda is.
- If one fails to perceive this, the fault lies with the individual who is misperceiving things, not with reality itself.
- Therefore, don’t feel sorry for the person who is miserable. They’re doing it to themselves.
Leaving aside whether the argument is sound, it is simple and clear enough to understand. That being the case, these seem to be the possible responses to it:
(1) There’s something wrong in AC’s argument here, either the premise or the inferences connecting the premise to the conclusion.
- Since the premise is love under will—in other words, a part of Thelema many Thelemites agree is its essence—then if the problem is with the premise, Thelema (at least as many Thelemites seem to understand it) is nonsense. One should probably not be a Thelemite.
- If it’s the inferences, then the condemnation of compassion in Liber AL is not what AC thought it was. This challenges the notion, oft repeated by AC himself, that he was in a unique, privileged position to interpret the BotL. (Crowley also denied he was able to exhaust the meaning of the book by means of his own analysis.) It also challenges at least the literal interpretation of The Comment, a Class A text, which O.T.O. policy and the behavior of a lot of Thelemites is based on.
- The premise (also) does not mean what AC thought it meant. This leads to the consequences of 1(b) and the additional consequence that there is no reason to agree on what the essence of Thelema even is. Some would undoubtedly celebrate this result.
(2) Both the premises and the inferences are correct. The problem is with those of us who still “suffer with others”. We’re not living in accordance with nature. We can either:
- Get our act together and “be Hadit” and “be kings,” or
- Choose not to. We’re always free to do that. Aiwass’ word for such people is “slaves”.
(3) Both the premises and the conclusion are correct, but one will just not be consistent on this point. Most followers of most religions aren’t consistent, and cognitive dissonance isn’t exactly rare, so this wouldn’t be anything new. Depending on how they interpret AL II.32, one might choose to fall back on Aiwass’ condemnation of reason.
While I present (2b) and (3) as separate, I think they’re effectively the same. In other words, I think being inconsistent on this particular point is just what AC (and for that matter Aiwass) meant by being a slave.
Another possibility is that there is no good reason to condemn compassion, but you had better do it anyway, because Aiwass commands it.
You disagree with Aiwass—so do all of us. The trouble is that He can say: “But I’m not arguing; I’m telling you.” (Magick Without Tears, XLVIII)
But I am assuming for the sake of discussion that there is an argument in favor of the position. Crowley seems to agree, otherwise he wouldn’t have presented the argument in the first place.
While I consider it of service to others to show what Crowley said about this issue, why he said what he said, what I perceive to be possible responses to this issue, and what I perceive to be the likely consequences of those responses, I have made an effort not to tell anyone what the best response is. If it appears as though I have attempted to tell anyone what they should do, then that is the result of accident rather than design. It is ultimately up to each individual to decide this question (and all questions regarding Liber AL vel Legis) for themselves by appeal to Crowley’s writings (or however they see fit).
The ground of the distinction between the finite will and the infinite will
1. “[Hadit] hath no Nature of His own, for He is that to which all Events occur.” (Djeridensis Comment on AL II.2)
2. The nature of something is its characteristic behavior, the way it tends to act.
3. Actions are intelligible in terms of their ends. Running and cooking are differentiated by the results they tend to realize. (It’s not necessary for the result to be separate from the doing. Consider the action “standing up.”)
4. Having no nature, Hadit has no characteristic end. (“For pure will, unassuaged of purpose, delivered from the lust of result, is every way perfect.” AL II.44)
5. But Hadit is not for that reason without activity. (“‘Come unto me’ is a foolish word: for it is I that go.” AL II.7)
6. Hadit is pure going—action done for its own sake. This is the same thing as Hadit having Nuit for his end. “But to love me is better than all things” (AL I.61) “Now Hadit knows Nuit by virtue of his ‘Going’ or ‘Love.’ It is therefore wrong to worship Hadit; one is to be Hadit, and worship Her.” (New Comment to AL II.8)
7. Hadit is the true self of the aspirant. (“Thou who art I beyond all I am, who hast no nature and no name…” Liber XV)
8. The activity of the true self is the true will. (“…the Adept will be free to concentrate his deepest self, that part of him which unconsciously orders his true Will…” Liber Samekh)
9. My true will being infinite—having no goal other than Nuit—it cannot be captured by any finite expression, not even a single word.
10. This is the ground for the distinction between finite will and infinite will which Crowley makes in Liber CL: “And to each will come the knowledge of his finite will, whereby one is a poet, one prophet, one worker in steel, another in jade. But also to each be the knowledge of his infinite Will, his destiny to perform the Great Work, the realization of his True Self.”
11. But the distinction between the finite will and the infinite will is a distinction of thought, not a real distinction. In other words, the difference between the infinite will and the finite will is a difference made only by the finite will. This is because the infinite will—almost by definition—can’t have anything to do with other than itself or its own pure activity.