human consciousness transcending the brain

Space-time, consciousness, and magick

Crowley accepted Henri Poincaré’s view that space and time have no objective validity but serve as mere conventions for the practice of physics. They do not give us genuine insight into the true nature of the external world. Rather, they are forms of perception chosen by natural selection for their usefulness. Thus in “Notes for an Astral Atlas,” Crowley quotes Poincaré discussing the relationship of geometry and evolution:

“On veut dire que par sélection naturelle notre esprit s’est adapté aux conditions du monde extérieur, qu’il a adopté la géométrie la plus avantageuse a l’espèce; ou en d’autres termes la plus commode. Cela est conforme tout a fait a nos conclusions; la géométrie n’est pas vraie: elle est avantageuse.”

Henri Poincaré, “La Science et l’Hypothèse,” quoted in Crowley, “Notes for an Astral Atlas”

Paraphrasing Poincaré’s conclusion, Crowley says:

Time and Space are forms by which we obtain (distorted) images of Ideas. Our measures of Time and Space are crude conventions, and differ widely for different Beings.

“Notes for an Astral Atlas”

He leverages this conclusion to support what he sees as an axiom of magick: the possible existence of conscious entities that are not dependent upon human-like brains.

“Hence: no a priori reason to deny the existence of conscious intelligences with insensible bodies. Indeed we know of other orders of mind (flies, etc., possibly vegetables) thinking by means of non-human brain-structures.”

“Notes for an Astral Atlas”

Crowley’s argument may be charitably reconstructed in the following way:

  1. Time and space do not pick out truth in whole or in part. They are merely ways evolution has equipped us for survival and reproduction.
  2. Time and space are therefore effects of a cause transcending them.
  3. Therefore objects in space and time we perceive are not real, either, and they have no causal efficacy, either over each other or our minds.
  4. Physicalism—the view that conscious experience can be nothing other than brain activity—is therefore wrong.
  5. So there is no reason in principle conscious intelligences could not exist independent of physical brains. In fact we are such intelligences.

More recently, cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman and mathematician Chetan Prakash have arrived at a similar conclusion with regard to the structure of our perception and its implications for philosophy of mind. On the basis of game theory simulations of evolution, in their 2014 paper “Objects of Consciousness” they conclude:

“…natural selection does not favor perceptual systems that see the truth in whole or in part. Instead, it favors perceptions that are fast, cheap, and tailored to guide behaviors needed to survive and reproduce. Perception is not about truth, it’s about having kids.”

Hoffman and Prakash, “Objects of Consciousness”, Frontiers in Psychology, vol 5

They then leverage this finding to support their hypothesis of conscious realism.

Conscious realism: The world W consists entirely of conscious agents

Ibid.

In other words, the dependence of conscious intelligence on brains is merely apparent. In fact consciousness is more fundamental than space-time and the objects in it.

Having established his own anti-physicalist stance on the basis of Poincaré’s conclusion, Crowley then raises what he terms the fundamental problem of religion.

“But the fundamental problem of Religion is this: Is there any praeter-human Intelligence, of the same order as our own, which is not dependent on cerebral structures consisting of matter in the vulgar sense of the word?”

Ibid

If physicalism is false, then that would explain the existence of what Crowley refers to as praeter-human intelligences, i.e., discarnate intelligences that were nevertheless able to communicate with us by means of the methods of magick. But it’s another matter entirely to prove that such intelligences actually exist.

Crowley goes on to claim that the reception of The Book of the Law in 1904 proved the existence of such intelligences.

“In a word, the Book of the Law proves the prime postulate of Religion.”

Ibid.

I’m not going to review the details of Crowley’s argument which he gives in “Notes” and in The Equinox of the Gods. I know very few people who accept the argument, though without doubt Crowley believed it.

These passages from “Notes” illustrate the epistemic relationship between Crowley’s views on magick and his understanding of physics, evolution, and mathematics. He thought Poincaré’s Darwin-informed neo-Leibnizian anti-physicalism made space for the satisfaction of what he called the postulate of religion. In fact Crowley understood the worldview of The Book of the Law as being both Leibnizian and Darwinian. I’ve made this case across multiple articles and lectures as this point.

This highlights yet another way in which Thelema is not simply a theory of ethics. It brings with it a certain view of the universe—a cosmology—which makes its core practices intelligible.

It also implies Thelema is falsifiable. If certain facts about the world don’t hold, then that undermines Thelema.

It’s quite striking that Crowley was aware of the most cutting edge science of his time and correctly understood its implications for philosophy of mind. It’s possible to argue with him about the significance of the reception of The Book of the Law, but there’s less doubt that he grasped the implications of Poincaré’s views on space and time for conscious intelligence. Some of the most interesting developments in cognitive science right now are exploring implications Crowley correctly identified a century ago.

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