1. “[Hadit] hath no Nature of His own, for He is that to which all Events occur.” (Djeridensis Comment on AL II.2)
2. The nature of something is its characteristic behavior, the way it tends to act.
3. Actions are intelligible in terms of their ends. Running and cooking are differentiated by the results they tend to realize. (It’s not necessary for the result to be separate from the doing. Consider the action “standing up.”)
4. Having no nature, Hadit has no characteristic end. (“For pure will, unassuaged of purpose, delivered from the lust of result, is every way perfect.” AL II.44)
5. But Hadit is not for that reason without activity. (“‘Come unto me’ is a foolish word: for it is I that go.” AL II.7)
6. Hadit is pure going—action done for its own sake. This is the same thing as Hadit having Nuit for his end. “But to love me is better than all things” (AL I.61) “Now Hadit knows Nuit by virtue of his ‘Going’ or ‘Love.’ It is therefore wrong to worship Hadit; one is to be Hadit, and worship Her.” (New Comment to AL II.8)
7. Hadit is the true self of the aspirant. (“Thou who art I beyond all I am, who hast no nature and no name…” Liber XV)
8. The activity of the true self is the true will. (“…the Adept will be free to concentrate his deepest self, that part of him which unconsciously orders his true Will…” Liber Samekh)
9. My true will being infinite—having no goal other than Nuit—it cannot be captured by any finite expression, not even a single word.
10. This is the ground for the distinction between finite will and infinite will which Crowley makes in Liber CL: “And to each will come the knowledge of his finite will, whereby one is a poet, one prophet, one worker in steel, another in jade. But also to each be the knowledge of his infinite Will, his destiny to perform the Great Work, the realization of his True Self.”
11. But the distinction between the finite will and the infinite will is a distinction of thought, not a real distinction. In other words, the difference between the infinite will and the finite will is a difference made only by the finite will. This is because the infinite will—almost by definition—can’t have anything to do with other than itself or its own pure activity.